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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In discussing capital punishment in this State it is frequently
assumed that North Dakota has abolished that punishment in all
cases. As the lawyers know, however, this is not true, for the
statute (Sec. 11110al) says: "Provided, that if a person shall
be convicted of murder in the first degree while under such life
sentence he may be punished by death."
Should it not be borne in mind, then, that this proviso was
put into the law for a purpose? What was that purpose, if it
was not protection to the men in charge of the state penitentiary? And if that was the purpose, then we have a right to
assume that the members of the legislature believed that the
proviso would act as a deterrent to the commission of such
crimes within the walls of the penitentiary. Hence, if capital
punishment is deemed a deterrent under those circumstances,
would it not be a deterrent under ordinary circumstances; in
fact, would it not be more of a deterrent to the commission of a
first crime than a deterrent to the commission of a second, third
or fourth?
The point was well presented at the annual meeting that so
long as the individual is deemed, under the law, to have the right
to take life as a matter of self-defense, there is no just ground
for denying society the right to take life for the same reason.
In other words, it was argued that the taking of life in cases of
first degree murder was not by way of punishment, but by way
of protecting society against other crimes of a similar nature,
by the same individual or by others.
There is another consideration, however, and this point was
not so thoroughly argued at the annual meeting. It is this: If
the members of the legislature considered it necessary to protect,
by the overhanging threat of capital punishment, the officials
and employees of our penitentiary, who are always well armed,
and, supposedly, always on guard, should not society exercise
the same care in protecting the ordinary citizen, who is
prevented from carrying weapons by law, and who is scarcely
ever on guard ?

